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ABSTRACT
Studies have shown how centralized institutions in resource management lead to adverse
impacts on communities. However, important questions remain about the mechanisms
through which people thrive under unfavorable policy environments. This paper examines
how locals around the Mount Cameroon National Park (MCNP) carve space for articulating their
agency despite unsympathetic management initiatives. Using focus group discussions and
thematic analysis of data from 17 villages, the results identified arrangements that do not
entirely solicit local consent in natural resource management. In this context, locals express
their agency holding onto cultural traditions through religious engagement and the use of
economic incentives to enhance livelihoods. They do so with the aid of traditional institutions,
awareness of system challenges, acting more wisely, and initiating constructive needs in
remote areas.
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Introduction
Implementing conservation policies for natural
resource management requires a proper inclusion of
indigenous/local people who hold local knowledge, i.e.
experiences adapted to the local culture and environ-
ment, embedded in community practices, institutions,
rituals and relationships, that change over time (FAO
2019). Such knowledge is integral to resource use
practices, held by societies that have a long history of
interaction with their natural surroundings, which is
crucial for decision-making (UNESCO 2017). This has
been the view shared in global policy frameworks such
as the Akwé: Kon Guidelines (Markkula, Turunen, and
Kantola 2019) and the UN Sustainable Development
Goals (SDG) (Tegegne et al. 2019). Both frameworks
advocate for the social inclusion of indigenous/local
people in development that might have an environ-
mental, social, and cultural impact on local commu-
nities. However, these legalities have often not lived up
to expectations when state institutions apply policy
initiatives for resource management at national and
local levels of society (Hirsenberger et al. 2019;
Markkula, Turunen, and Kantola 2019; Owuor, Icely,
and Newton 2019; Ramcilovic-Suominen 2019; Sen
and Pattanail 2019; Sloan et al. 2019).
It is noted, for example, that in this unfavorable
policy context, management institutions request local
people to comply with regime practices rather than
values and beliefs of the local community (Nadasdy
2003, 2005). Even so, where an overlap exists between
cultural ideologies of locals and political interest of the
state, practices of natural resource management end
up reflecting the priorities of powerful parties instead
of local people (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004).
Scholars have equally shown that management institu-
tions that obtain shared power from central govern-
ments becomemore powerful and are inclined to exert
control over marginalized people (Spaeder and Harvey
2005). Without a critical study of these antagonistic
processes, we risk extending the difficulties commu-
nities face in resource management.
Centralized resource management
Several cases on the top-down management of natural
resources seem consistent with the views outlined
above. For instance, in countries of former
Yugoslavia, the lack of open constructive criticism
and feedback between conveners of natural resource
management projects and local people has led to
ineffectiveness in conserving cultural heritage
(Hirsenberger et al. 2019). In Laos, ethnic minorities
are losing access to fundamental subsistence liveli-
hoods due to the Laos Central government’s reinven-
tion of Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation (RED+) initiatives – to issue fund-
ing for forest bureaucracy, large-scale land conces-
sions, and activities of development industries
(Ramcilovic-Suominen 2019).
Studies also observed that despite legalities for con-
serving National Parks in Northern Finland, the Sámi
continue to face an increase in land pressures from
industrial activities, due to inadequacies of state laws
that do not fully protect Sámi lands from
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encroachments (Markkula, Turunen, and Kantola 2019).
Consider the example of the Trans-Papuan Corridor in
New Guinea. Here, the Papuan government backed
a mega rice project on peatlands, including mining,
oil, and gas extraction projects in protected areas. This
use of the land has been part of a state-led develop-
ment agenda to promote resource-extraction (Sloan
et al. 2019). In effect, this has purported indigenous
Papuans to put forth customary land claims as many of
them await formal concessions for their land loss in
state-protected forests.
Further, on the example of the El Vizcaino Biosphere
Reserve in Mexico, several stakeholders jointly formed
Advisory Councils (ACs) since the 1990s, for collective
decision-making and implementation of natural
resource management, though, steered under centra-
lized institutions. A recent study, however, showed
that, despite this move, ACs have little power because
they rely on resources from government agencies
which are often reluctant to approve decisions that
do not reflect the political interest of the state
(Brenner 2019). Thus, even with the participation of
persons who represent local resource users, ACs fail
to integrate the genuine interests of local people.
The posing of these case examples is important for
revealing the adverse outcomes of policies for natural
resource management in different communities.
However, we suggest that, within this setting, it will
be useful to explore the mechanisms that enable peo-
ple to thrive under undesirable resource management.
This could help offer ideas for policy improvement.
Choice of study and the niche for collective agency
We find the case of Mount Cameroon National Park
(MCNP) and adjacent communities significant because,
given that UN protocols promote biodiversity conser-
vation in ways that should properly include local/indi-
genous people in decision-making, the regime in this
case, however, implements natural resource manage-
ment in ways that seem antagonistic to cultural heri-
tage. There is an urgent need to investigate whether
locals adversely affected by state initiatives for natural
resource management, find other means to convey
their agency.
Agency is not a new concept. In contemporary
Sociology, Anthony Giddens’ work on agency
describes the contingent relations between structure
and action, and, its impact on the cultural formation
(Karp 1986). Here, the structure comprises of all
arrangements that stimulate or limit opportunities
and choices in society – and eventually shapes
human behavior. In general, agency can be defined
as a transformative concept about how a group or
individual is capable of acting in the face of challenges,
through the lens of various contexts. This might
include relations of deriving power (Drydyk 2013;
Hanmer and Klugman 2016); assigning responsibilities
to bring change (Dowding 2008); habits that develop
in response to dynamic environments (Ransan-Cooper
(2016); and collective action in instances of community
resistance and dialogue (Stammler and Wilson
(2006, 22).
Previous scholars in the conservation and resource
management literature, have used agency to explore
the degree to which locals shape their engagement
with different systems, and how this engagement may
enable or disable the capacity of local people to act
(Chirozva 2015; Cole et al. 2019). Also, how locals culti-
vate awareness and motivation to participate in con-
servation programs, such as the World Wildlife Fund
(WWF) and Wine Initiative (BWI) in South Africa (Honig
et al. 2015). Accordingly, agency is not always overt
action or active community engagement to change
something, but, includes practices of alternative beha-
vior on the part of local people. In this paper, we
explore this explanation based on collective agency –
a concept where behavior is not only due to discontent
against an undesirable management system, but also,
how economic benefits and religious tradition justify
the behavior of local people. In doing so, we include
more passive approaches such as expression of frustra-
tion or grievances in our definition of agency by tar-
geting three specific objectives:
(1) To identify the complex nature of the MCNP
system of natural resource management.
(2) To examine how locals living around MCNP con-
vey their agency beneath this adversarial policy
environment.
(3) To determine the enabling mechanisms of
agency under which locals carve space for thriv-
ing in unfavorable management situations.
Materials and methods
Study site and governance structure
MCNP is located in the southwest region of Cameroon,
sub-Saharan West Africa. The park is host to Mount
Cameroon, which is part of the eight-biodiversity hot-
spots in the Gulf of Guinea. Its peak is 4,100 meters
above sea level and is located at latitude 4°N of the
Equator and longitude 9°E of the Meridian. The annual
precipitation within MCNP is between 2,000 and
10,000 millimeters, while the temperatures range
between 4°C at the top of the mountain and 32°C at
the base of the mountain (Charlotte 2014, 17–18).
Volcanic soils influence rich biodiversity with some
estimated 2,435 plant species recorded in the area.
There are 41 villages adjacent to the park with an
estimated population of 100,000 inhabitants. The
Bakweri, who have long been in the area, constitute
less than 30% of this population estimate. Activities of
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managing MCNP influence the livelihoods of local peo-
ple, both directly and indirectly. The socio-economic
activities of villagers range from hunting, timber
exploitation, subsistence farming and keeping cattle,
to small trading in agricultural products, herbal plants,
and wild fruits.
In terms of the governance structure, the Bakweri
inhabited the lower slopes of Mount Cameroon many
years before the advent of colonialism in the 19th
century. Around the 1850s, Bakweri patrilineal relatives
and families lived in settlements led by lineage elders
where they grazed livestock, cultivated crops, and
hunted games (Ardener 1970, 140–144). However, the
formal context for governing the land came after
a series of events, including German colonization in
1884, the loss of Bakweri land to German colonialists
following a war in 1891and subsequent land reforms
such as the 1974 land tenure law that created state
lands while eradicating former claims for Bakweri land
ownership (Assembe-Mvondo et al. 2014).
Following Cameroon’s signatory to the 1992 UN
Convention on Biodiversity, the state adopted a 1994
forestry and wildlife law for the sustainable manage-
ment of natural resources through the development of
protected areas such as national parks. Section 72 of
this law prohibits unauthorized entry, hunting of cer-
tain animals and the harvesting of various plants per-
ceived as endangered in protected areas. Article 8 of
this law, however, grants some usage rights to the
locals stating:
‘Customary rights are those recognized by local popula-
tions to exploit all forest, wildlife and fish products,
except for protected species, for their personal use.
They may be temporarily or permanently suspended
when the need arises for reasons of public interest’
(Republic of Cameroon 1994).
The 1994 law (Part 1, section 7) further regulates rights
to land ownership stating:
‘The state, local Councils, village communities and pri-
vate individuals may exercise on their forest and aqua-
cultural establishments all the rights that result from
ownership subject to restrictions laid down in the regula-
tions governing land tenure and state lands and by this
law’ (Republic of Cameroon 1994).
In 2009, the state, through a Prime Ministerial Decree
(No. 2009/2272) created MCNP. This establishment
came with the demarcation of 58,178 hectares of
land into four cluster conservation zones including
Buea in the southeastern flank of Mount Cameroon,
Muyuka in the northeast, Bomboko in the northwest,
and West Coast to the west of the mountain (Figure 1).
For the state to administer MCNP and its adjacent
villages, a Ministerial decision of the Ministry of
Forestry and Wildlife (a state institution that oversees
the management of protected areas in Cameroon) in
August 2014 introduced a plan for natural resource
management (Charlotte 2014). In effect, the decision
endorsed the task for a unit (MCNP Service) to ensure
the preservation of biodiversity on Mount Cameroon
through the involvement of local communities.
MCNP Service officials conduct resource manage-
ment duties along with the participation of stake-
holders from Divisional, Sub-divisional, Regional and
National levels of the society. For instance, through
agreements known as ‘memorandums of understand-
ing’, the MCNP Service collaborates with local and
international institutions (non-governmental and gov-
ernmental) to meet its management objectives. For
instance, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), a German institution, has been
at the core of implementing the MCNP Service’s goals
for the sustainable development of natural resources
over the last decade. MCNP Service also collaborates
with five Sub-divisional Councils (Buea, Limbe II,
Mbonge, Muyuka, Idenau) of the Fako Division in the
southwest region of Cameroon.
Data collection
We used Focus Group Discussions (FGD) to collect data
between August and December 2017. FGD is a form of
qualitative research that involves gathering a diverse
group of people from a community to discuss their
opinions, beliefs, and perceptions about a topic of
interest. In recent years, the use of focus groups has
been a cornerstone of studies associated with pro-
tected areas (Mutanga, Never, and Edson 2017).
Understanding that collective agency includes passive
behavior among locals that might not entirely be of
active community engagement to change something,
FGD was important for us to uncover data about atti-
tudes, desires, and reactions not conveyed by other
techniques in research. Determining the focus groups
entailed a process of obtaining authorization from
Cameroon’s Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, during
the year 2017. Followed by a review of documents
archived at the MCNP Service office in Buea. These
documents comprised of Agro Socio-economic
Assessment (ASEA) reports for 41 villages around
Mount Cameroon.
Our intention for review was to understand how the
livelihoods of villages around MCNP might differ, and
for us to develop a purposive sample from them. By
definition, purposive sampling is a random selection of
sampling units from a population with the most rele-
vant information on characteristics of interest to the
researcher (Guarte and Barrios 2006). In doing so, we
focused on selecting focus groups from villages whose
livelihoods connect to MCNP, i.e. they share common
practices of timber exploitation, hunting, and farming
around the park. These are activities equally regulated
by the management regime.
The chosen villages are host to the Bakweri ethnicity
with a communal lifestyle, where village groups/
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Figure 1. Cluster conservation zones. Adapted from the MCNP Service (2017).
Figure 2. Discussions with locals. Authors’ field data gathered in 2017.
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committees and membership, led by Chiefs (village
heads), form the traditional basis for enhancing the
everyday activities in communities. This communal
nature explains our choice for targeting focus groups
(Figure 2). In consultation with Chiefs and park officials
to gather participants for FGD, the Chiefs assigned 16
individuals to represent eight groups for every study
village. In these villages, residents traditionally honor
their Chiefs for leadership skills, knowledge, and their
ability to appoint persons they see as competent to
share ideas with visitors in support of their village. The
participants belong to various community groups that
included:
(a) Village Development Group: A group created by
the villagers to promote the well-being of the
local community.
(b) Village Forest Management Committee: Created
by park officials in collaboration with village
inhabitants to share ideas on matters of park
management.
(c) Vigilante Group: Established by the villagers to
look after the security of village inhabitants.
(d) Traditional Council: A traditional body that
advises chiefs on matters of land and other
disputes.
(e) Health Committee: Members of this group work
together with the state to provide health assis-
tance to villagers.
(f) Hunters Group: Members of this group engage
in hunting and distribution of proceeds from
the hunting to villagers.
(g) Quarter Heads: Members are usually leaders of
sub-residential areas within a village and they
function as sub-Chiefs.
(h) Farmers Group: Members work together in plan-
ning and training individuals on farming,
distributing seeds, equipment, farm products
and sharing funds from the sale of farm
produce.
Before meetings, we obtained informed consent
directly from participants using letters signed by
Chiefs on behalf of the locals. We then briefed partici-
pants on the subject matter of natural resource man-
agement. The FGD was guided by the following
questions:
● What opinions do locals have regarding the ben-
efits and worries of the state system of natural
resource management?
● How do locals move on with their everyday life of
attaining cultural needs amid difficulties brought
by this system?
● What circumstances enable local people to act
and decide on ways to satisfy their needs regard-
less of unfavorable policy arrangements?
The study groups promote a sense of communal
support, make decisions for community benefit, and
participate in various activities (Table 1). The gender
variation attributes to the fact that local women in
the villages have a vital role in their homes, where
they oversee family issues, while the men perform
influential roles within administrative settings away
from home and in support of their communities.
The lead author moderated the focus group meet-
ings and a research assistant took charge of taking
notes during the FGD. Four cluster facilitators (park
officials tasked to intercede in support of village
inhabitants concerning issues related to MCNP)
assisted us with translations during meetings. The
languages of discussion were Mokpwe and Pidgin
English.
Table 1. Distribution of study villages around MCNP.
Cluster conservation
zones Villages The approximate distance of the village from park boundary (km) Males Females
Buea Bonakanda 1-6 13 3
West Coast Lower Boando 6–12 12 4
Batoke 1–6 9 7
Bakingili 1–6 11 5
Njonje 1–6 9 7
Bibunde 6–12 12 2
Sanje 6–12 15 1
Muyuka Lykoko 12 12 4
Munyenge 6–12 12 4
Bomboko Bomana 1-6 14 2
Big Koto I 1–6 13 3
Efolofo 6–12 14 2
Kuke Kumbo 1–6 15 1
Munyange 6–12 16 0
Mundongo 6–12 15 1
Bova Bomboko 6–12 14 2
Boviongo 6–12 13 3
Total 17 - 219 51
Source: Authors’ presentation of data adapted from Nebasifu and Atong (2019).
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Data analysis
To summarise the bulk of information, we employed
the views of Costa et al. (2016) in the thematic analysis
of focus group data (Table 2). The analysis was mainly
inductive by questioning multiple opinions from field
data, looking at various assumptions, patterns, expla-
nations, and integrating them into the results consis-
tent with the research questions. This approach
entailed reading transcripts, field notes, listening to
voice recordings from focus group meetings, exploring
different responses of participants, and, identifying
and defining themes in the data collected. Data
responses were the first subject to open coding
adapted from Costa et al. (2016, 38) to produce themes
and raise questions about various extracts from FGD
which we then integrated into the results below.
Results
For us to examine the collective agency of residents in
the study area, we need to understand the difficulties
posed by the state’s resource management procedure.
In this section of the paper, we use two main headings.
First, to show the complex nature of the management
system, and second, to demonstrate how locals
express their agency under this system.
Complexities of the management system
Arrangements for participation
Although dissimilar views exist among locals regard-
ing the challenges of participating in state plans for
resource management, some observations can be
made about the management system. For instance,
with the creation of MCNP in 2009, park officials
endorsed the creation of Village Forest
Management Committees (VFMC) – discussion for-
ums through which village inhabitants discuss ideas
about the management of natural resources.
Through management activities, locals receive var-
ious state-led initiatives, including employment in
management schemes for harvesting Prunus
Africana (a wild medicinal plant on Mount
Cameroon that contains anti-cancer properties,
exported to other countries) and wild honey,
partaking in sensitisation programmes for agricul-
tural development, participating in the organisation
of cluster platform meetings, park boundary clearing
and monitoring together with park officials.
These arrangements, however, come with difficul-
ties. For instance, despite efforts by park officials to
integrate locals into their management agenda, the
regime strictly prohibits some of the traditional/sub-
sistence activities such as animal trapping, hunting,
and fishing in protected areas of Mount Cameroon,
activities which the locals were culturally entitled to
for many years prior to the advent of MCNP.
Further, to determine local/indigenous rights to use
MCNP, the current management plan uses
Conservation Development Agreements (CDA) and sti-
pulations of the 1994 state forestry and wildlife law
(Charlotte 2014). Both frameworks do not provide
a clear and solicited basis for exerting the customary
rights of local/indigenous people to use protected
areas. Unfortunately, the terms for locals to exercise
their customary rights have not been appropriately
recognized by decree. The lack of any procedures to
institute customary law in practice leads to disputes
among forest stakeholders.
Even so, the CDA warrants locals to obtain state
assistance based mostly on how the locals comply
with state laws. In other words, the management
regime promotes local interests primarily in those
activities that serve to achieve visions of the state,
and this is why some of the locals perceive the man-
agement system as conflicting to their cultural needs.
This process of governing the rights of people indi-
cates the complex nature of the resource management
system.
Negative impacts on the community
We see the consequence of this complexity in the
complaints local people have against interferences on
their farmlands. For instance, during group discussions,
respondents spoke about clashes between their
knowledge of the land and the views of park officials.
In this situation, the locals attempted to protect their
use of the land against the desires of the management
regime. We observed local responses to these negative
impacts in three instances: (a) where private farms,
Table 2. Adapting Costa et al.’s (2016) thematic analysis for focus group data in villages around MCNP.
Open coding Theme Raising questions in the description
Traditional practices Activities of spiritual value Do these activities continue to take place? In what settings on the land
are these activities more frequent? Why do people get involved in
these traditions?
Opinions about co-management Benefits and shortcomings of the
resource management system
Some villagers gain from interacting with park officials. Other villagers
experience losses from their relations with the State. What explains
this assertion and how do villagers respond in these situations?
Alternative livelihoods Other sources of satisfying needs
apart from those of the
management regime
Among the villagers who criticize the system, how and why are they able
to satisfy their needs without the immediate help of the State?
Source: Authors’ illustration using data collected in 2017
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which locals own, share boundary with state-protected
areas; (b) where animals from the park intrude on
farmlands to feed on crops, and (c) where locals
express their grievances against unfulfilled promises
by the regime.
In the first instance, the locals cultivate crops on
farmlands inherited from their ancestors that are in
close contact with the MCNP boundary. At times, dur-
ing periodic alterations of the park boundary, new
boundary lines trespass into these farmlands without
the knowledge of local people. As a result, the respon-
dents furiously blamed park officials for not consulting
with them during changes in park boundaries. We see
such a state of frustration in the following words of
a farmer in Farmers Group:
‘I have always owned and used my farm in the past
years. But now, the park people come, they beat us in
the farm and say we are farming on park boundary land.
During the time we have been collaborating with the
park authorities, they have not been working to the
advantage of the villagers but rather to their advan-
tage . . . ’ (FGD 2017).
On the second point, reports about animals intruding
on private farms in Bibunde, Njonje, and Batoke raised
the fears of local people. Our focus group meetings
showed that crop damage on farmlands close to park
boundaries led to physical confrontations between the
locals and animals from the park. As a member of the
Traditional Council puts it:
‘At night, the elephants come down from the mountain
and eat our crops and we are left with the very little
harvest at the end. I have seen monkeys eating my crops,
but I am not able to stop them because the park autho-
rities do not let us hunt them. If we do, they punish us.
They should find a solution!’ (FGD 2017).
According to this example, the locals whose crops
were heavily damaged felt that the regime does very
little to address the problem of animal encroachment
on their farms but instead imposes heavy sanctions for
persons who injure state-protected animals. To quote
the view of another member of the Vigilante Group:
‘The punishment from park staff for persons caught in
attacking or injuring animals which are protected in the
park is . . . heavy and unaffordable fines’ (FGD 2017).
During fieldwork, we met a hunter at Kuke Kumbo,
who spoke of having stumbled uponmonkeys destroy-
ing crops on his farmland. He explained that it was
frustrating to have no reliable means of intervening,
due to fear of legal charges by the regime and his
inability to pay unaffordable fines for hurting animals.
The third way of responding to negative impacts
was the expression of grievances relating to unfulfilled
state promises. In Munyenge, a respondent of the
Village Development Group who was aware of pro-
mised development by the regime claimed that park
authorities had procured more from village residents
and invested less in the community. Also, in the
Bomboko area, following claims about land ownership
by the regime, some respondents were unpleased by
park restrictions against harvesting forest resources,
which they perceived as an important source of liveli-
hood to the local community. Unsatisfied by the activ-
ities of the regime, a member of the Farmers Group
argued as follows:
‘My farm, which was close to the park, has now been
claimed as government land and so I have to depend on
what the government can give us to survive on’ (FGD
2017).
Another local in the Hunters Group added:
‘I do not harvest much from my farm anymore because
the park people are there. They say my farm is within
park boundary land. The park people must consult with
our traditional authorities so we can bring this problem
to an end’ (FGD 2017).
Consequently, the locals address the above grievances
by engaging in different ways to safeguard their
knowledge of the land. They do so by ‘negotiating for
compensation’ of the land, requesting for develop-
ment support in exchange for their will to comply
with state forestry laws. For example, in Big Koto,
Efolofo, and Bonakanda, some respondents demanded
park authorities to provide drinkable water to their
communities. A local at Bomboko emphasized the
fact that the regime ignores the interests of locals
during the execution of projects. We observed another
example from a farmer at Big Koto, who complained of
the low wages paid to him under the Prunus Africana
management scheme. These examples reflect the com-
plex nature of the resource management system and
how the locals respond.
Expressing collective agency
In this section, the evidence presented about expres-
sing agency reflects in practices of alternative behavior
among locals, to hold onto certain livelihoods and
cultural traditions, rather than renegotiating the sub-
ordinate role they occupy in the resource management
regime.
Using economic incentives for livelihood progress
For instance, although some village groups were unfa-
vorably impacted by the system of resource manage-
ment, the results revealed that some focus groups in
other localities had found ways of getting around the
system by using economic incentives of the regime to
make their livelihoods work better in spite of antago-
nistic policies on the community. When we questioned
focus groups at Muyuka and Buea concerning gaining
from their interaction with park officials, they spoke
about using the economic incentives of the manage-
ment system to satisfy local needs as noted in the
ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY 7
views of a member in the Village Forest Management
Committee:
‘When we co-operate with the park authorities, we get to
learn other ways of harvesting honey, planting cassava
and bush mango which we sell by ourselves to the
community and generate income through membership
in co-operatives. They also train us on conservation
procedures by teaching us how to plant useful trees
and create propagators for nursing plants’ (FGD 2017).
Doing so, however, requires a degree of compliance
with rules of the management regime. For instance, at
Bonakanda, Bomana, and Lykoko, respondents indi-
cated that some of them had gained employment by
co-operating with the regime in ecotourism activities.
In the same way, respondents at Bonakanda were
optimistic, insinuating that such collaboration would
help them preserve forest resources for future
generations.
Based on discussions at Batoke, Bakingili, Lower
Boando, Njonje, Sanje, Bomana, Kuke Kumbo,
Munyange, and Lykoko, the groups welcomed the
supply of social amenities by the state for the well-
being of village inhabitants. These villages receive
machinery from park officials to process farm crops
such as cassava and plantain. With the help of conser-
vation bonuses, which are funds from the state, these
groups were able to secure the supply of drinkable
water, community halls, and to purchase chairs and
canopies they use for village meetings. This was the
opinion of a local in the Health Committee:
‘We now benefit from our village market, which the park
authorities built and now it is giving us some hope. We
have been able to have water supply in the village,
community halls, and canopies that we use for public
meetings’ (FGD 2017).
In Muyuka and Bomboko, respondents used develop-
ment incentives as sources for generating income. In
these cluster zones of MCNP, the locals convert frag-
ments of the land for cocoa cultivation. Cocoa
accounts for about 50% of agricultural income to
farmers living in these zones. Further, FGD at
Muyuka indicated that people profit more from agri-
culture in comparison to hunting due to state prohi-
bitions in the park. Similarly, in Bibunde and Batoke,
the villagers engage in fishing as an alternative
source of food and income. Many farmers in these
villages use farm equipment and gain training skills
from park officials to produce food crops sold in
nearby markets. Accordingly, we see how even
where regimes for natural resource management do
not entirely meet the expectations of communities,
the locals can profit from other sources of income in
the system.
We see agency in semi-formalized arrangements
that help locals decide on attaining other needs
using the income they earn from gathering non-
timber forest products through a state-backed organi-
zation, Mount Cameroon Prunus Management
Company. Within this organization, the locals work as
harvesters in a state-induced management scheme for
Prunus Africana. A member of the Health Committee in
Muyuka made the following observation:
‘Unions help the villagers to work together and jointly
plan finances earned from harvesting Prunus for pur-
chasing healthcare services and to pay for education
for their children.’ (FGD 2017)
Although some participants in Buea and Muyuka were
unhappy about this level of collaboration for reasons
of low income paid to harvesters, the locals indicated
that the scheme enabled them to create Prunus
Africana harvesters’ unions, i.e. joint economic initia-
tives that locals use as a means to support livelihoods
other than those seen as visions of the state. The fact
that a group of people chose not to fight the park
system but rather used alternative strategies to circum-
vent it, is in our opinion also an expression of collective
agency.
Maintaining cultural practices through religious
expression
The use of state forestry laws to limit locals from enter-
ing MCNP changed the forest-based subsistent activ-
ities of local people. There were, however, some
exceptions to this view. Among the Bakweri, sacred
societies and Traditional Councils of elders are crucial
institutions for decision-making on issues of preserving
cultural heritage, although such power is gradually
declining with the introduction of committees. Group
discussions showed that dominant sacred societies
such as the Maale and the Liengu societies played an
active role in villages to meet cultural needs aside from
the will of the management regime.
On the example of Maale, this sacred society repre-
sents a medium of religious activity for justifying the
need to preserve natural resources – upon worshiping
a spiritual being, Efassa moto, whom the Bakweri see as
the protector of their land. The locals equally believe
this spiritual being has the mystical power to cause
natural disasters when park officials fail to support
ritual practices in the park. Thus, the loss of biodiversity
on MCNP will imply a manifestation of the wrath of
Efassa moto for failure by the community to perform
certain ritual rites (Monono et al. 2016). Maale has
equally been not only a sacred society but also,
a symbolic religious tradition of the Bakweri (Ofege
2007) which, nowadays, appears to be a metaphysical
space for locals to exert their agency.
In this religious situation, ritual practices take place
on the land. Often, knowledge about the sites used for
rituals are secretly kept away from the general public
except for native people initiated in sacred societies as
stated in the words of a local in Quarter Head:
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‘You must consult with the Chief to know clear spots of
cultural importance. There are places only known by
native people. Sometimes, to visit these spots, you must
also consult the gods of the land. Failure for any local to
do so means disrespect to village authority and culture’
(FGD 2017).
In this example, the agency develops from people’s
knowledge of preserving sacred sites. The respondent
also reiterates the importance of acknowledging vil-
lage authority by consulting with Chiefs before visiting
sacred sites. In all the study groups, participants speci-
fied that they performed rituals through traditional
festivals and sacred ceremonies. Again, theMaale ritual
is an example performed annually in an appeal for
Efassa moto to bring peace and prosperity to the com-
munity. A member of the Traditional Council
explained:
‘During this period, we go into the park and perform our
Njoku tradition. You dance spiritually, while in the vil-
lage, you do it physically, i.e. in public’ (FGD 2017).
Information obtained during focus group meetings
indicated that rituals help to prevent naturally induced
damages on the land. For instance, whenever
a volcanic eruption occurs on the mountain, locals
perform rituals requesting Efassa moto to safeguard
vegetation and farmlands from destruction.
Consider the words of a local in Hunters Group:
‘The elders go there to consult the gods when we have
problems in the community like the widespread death of
people in the villages and the quick dryness of streams
and rivers.’ (FGD 2017)
In the narratives of the Njoku tradition, respondents
mentioned totemic practices – the act of perceiving
humans as having mystical relations with a spiritual
being through transforming into a plant, an object, or
an animal. Here, locals who practice the Njoku tradition
go into the forest to ask their ancestors to intervene in
times of need. As a member of the Village
Development Committee added:
‘Our local culture and beliefs move along with a reliance
on the natural environment. There are localized tradi-
tional manifestations that warrant masquerades to
move into the forest. When they do so, they collect
barks of trees and herbs that are necessary for perform-
ing the traditional rights of appeasing the gods to inter-
vene in times of trouble and need’ (FGD 2017).
Along the line of Njoku tradition, a local in the Hunters
Group noted:
‘We have been told of the stories that people who are
active in the sacred societies have certain powers
obtained from our ancestors to spiritually transcend at
night into the bodies of elephants in the park and influ-
ence life events. By doing so, the people can react
against intruders on their farmland by using the ele-
phants to chase persons away’ (FGD 2017).
In other words, even where resource management by
the regime does not entirely address the need for
spiritual intervention in complex situations, the locals
can flout certain visions of the regime to preserve their
heritage. They specifically do so to keep intruders away
from their land as stated in the above quotation from
a local.
Another example of using the religious expression
to maintain cultural practices connects to caves and
water. In the Bomboko area, there is a cave known as
Isuma, located in the peripheral zones of MCNP.
According to a hunter in this area, only native people
who visit the cave to contact ancestral spirits know the
location of Isuma. Similarly, on the West Coast, there is
a spot known as the red hill. A member of the Village
Development Group explained:
‘During the Maale ritual, community members use the
caves to carry out animal sacrifices and libations. Only
a few individuals know the location of the sacred sites in
use’ (FGD 2017).
Moreover, in Bakingili and Lower Boando, knowledge
of the mamid tradition exists under a Liengu sacred
society. According to this example, locals are ‘respon-
sible caretakers of the sea’. The respondents talked
about worshiping a goddess of the sea, locally referred
to as Liengu-la-mwanja. In this instance, the locals
maintain ritual practices despite the inadequacy of
the resource management system to recognize the
customary rights of using the land. The locals see this
collective act as crucial for retaining harmony and
solidity in their community, such as in situations, fol-
lowing unexpected natural disasters and the wide-
spread death of people.
On the example of Womba (a huge tree that has
grown for hundreds of years close to park boundaries),
participants stated that because theWomba tree hosts
spirits of ancestors, they need to preserve it. Every
night before traditional festivals, ritualists (also known
inmokpwe as Sango y a bando) sacrifice goats and pour
libation beneath theWomba tree. They stated that this
was an activity used to plead for the intervention of
ancestral spirits to protect people during cultural
events. Further, respondents were mindful of sustain-
ing such relationships with spiritual beings at the
family level, which they believe influenced the nature
of everyday life. These were the words of a member of
the Farmers Group concerning family worship:
‘In some villages, family members worship a spiritual
figure of the family camp called Ikomu Njewoka. This
figure represents an object of spiritual value, dug from
the ground by the camp leader, who sees and/or com-
prehends the object as one that protects his family and
children. Some families do have another tradition called
Lisomelele. This means that every year, the family head
pours libation on doorposts, from the right to the left
side of the door using his right hand . . . ’ (FGD 2017).
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Thus, one could say the locals possess their agency
through religious engagement, often, in secret, to pre-
serve relevant traditions that help maintain life stability
in their communities.
Discussion
The above results identified difficulties of a state-led
natural resource management system and examined
instances of locals conveying their agency. This is what
we describe as expressing a collective agency in antag-
onistic policy environments. From this study, we can
draw three interpretations of the literature on resource
management regimes and notions of agency:
First, on the complexity of resource management,
previous scholars have explored the setbacks of top-
down management systems (Borrini-Feyerabend et al.
2004; Nadasdy 2003, 2005; Spaeder and Harvey 2005).
They note that in such systems, political interests and
eagerness for local compliance with visions of govern-
ments tend to overshadow the local values and needs
of communities. A few cases such as in Laos
(Ramcilovic-Suominen 2019) and Papua New Guinea
(Sloan et al. 2019) are partly a reflection of the above
critiques – where both management regimes, advo-
cate for development plans of economic integration
and industrial investment at the detriment of local/
indigenous rights in land use.
Consistent with the views outlined above, the
example of MCNP and adjacent communities suggest
another complex form of this centralized structure.
Here, though, the state shares its power to local units
towards the management of natural resources. It
adopts certain arrangements for local participation
issued through initiatives that do not entirely solicit
local consent for customary rights. This lack of reason-
able consultation with locals partly reflects on occa-
sions of land encroachment and grievances against the
regime.
Second, on examining expressions of agency, pre-
vious literature explains agency based on how locals
determine their engagement with systems, and how
such engagement either allows or restricts their capa-
city to act (Chirozva 2015; Cole et al. 2019). Scholars
also relate agency to how locals develop awareness
and motivation to participate in conservation pro-
grams (Honig et al. 2015). However, our analysis
revealed that agency also pertains to processes by
which locals attempt to thrive where the tasks of nat-
ural resource managers do not seem to work in their
favor. In such processes, the agency is not entirely of
active community engagement to change something,
but also includes passive behaviors where community
members reshape economic incentives of the regime
towards livelihood improvement, as well as, using reli-
gious tradition to justify their cultural needs. This
shows the potential for locals to cultivate flexible
ways of living on the land amid undesirable situations
of resource management.
Third, regarding the enabling mechanisms under
which locals carve space for thriving in unfavorable
management systems, we found that certain factors/
conditions were essential. Previous studies have iden-
tified determinant factors of agency such as: where
environmental changes trigger the habits of people
(Ransan-Cooper 2016); where people assign responsi-
bilities to act (Dowding 2008); and in practices that
stimulate resistance or dialogue among people
(Stammler and Wilson (2006), to name a few. While
we agree with this scholarship, our study suggests
other mechanisms for agency in antagonistic policy
environments. For instance, where traditional institu-
tions, i.e. sacred societies and Traditional Councils have
an active role in communities. These institutions are
often a source of ‘local capital’ for the agency for
maintaining culturally relevant needs, even when
regimes do not legalize such institutions in their man-
agement agenda.
Another enabling factor for agency is the differ-
ences in state monitoring activities among villages
across cluster conservation zones of MCNP. In localities
within the West Coast and Buea that are closer to
urban districts with greater road accessibility, group
discussions showed that park officials regularly visit
these localities to monitor the extent to which com-
munities comply with state forestry laws, giving little
space for locals who intend to maintain their subsis-
tence use of forest land. On the contrary, villages in
Bomboko and Muyuka, which were less accessible to
park officials due to poor road infrastructure and remo-
teness, had greater space for locals to maintain certain
religious and subsistence practices.
Related to the above factor, scholars have observed
‘power’ as a mechanism for agency (Drydyk 2013;
Hanmer and Klugman 2016). In the resource manage-
ment literature, power often reflects the ability to exert
control or influence management decisions (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2004). Our study showed that situa-
tions of less state control, i.e. where state forestry laws
are less active in a community, locals were able to cope
with difficulties by using contradictory management
processes to initiate constructive needs. In Bomboko,
for instance, a farmer began negotiating compensa-
tion for the land he lost to the regime. Another local in
the same area spoke about the need to sustain the
Njoku tradition for the harmony and solidity of his
community. In such instances, the collective agency
occurs in people’s capability to utilize unfavorable
situations of management in advancing issues that
are of relevant need to them.
Honig et al. (2015) concluded that the agency of
locals to participate in conservation programs are
defined by either motivation or awareness about the
provisions of such programs. By comparison, the MCNP
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case indicated that awareness enabled respondents to
express various complaints against the regime. In this
example, locals knew shortcomings in the manage-
ment system, which incited them to voice their dissa-
tisfaction. For example, in Munyenge, the locals whose
farmlands were encroached upon through unan-
nounced changes in park boundaries insisted that
park officials consult with them on such activities in
the future. In Bomboko, the locals bargained for sup-
port of state forestry laws on a condition that the
regime enhances the well-being of their community
and recognizes locals’ rights to use their land.
Conclusion
We set out to gather partial insights on processes of
collective agency to address questions that remain
about understanding how communities attempt to thrive
under unfavorable policy environments of resource man-
agement. We revisited previous literature on challenges
encountered in processes of top-down resourcemanage-
ment (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Hirsenberger et al.
2019; Markkula, Turunen, and Kantola 2019; Nadasdy
2003, 2005; Owuor, Icely, and Newton 2019; Ramcilovic-
Suominen 2019; Sloan et al. 2019; Spaeder and Harvey
2005). Our premise was that understanding that previous
studies present examples that are important for revealing
the adversarial effects of state-led natural resource man-
agement procedures, there is a need to understand how
people find other ways to meet their needs even in these
undesirable settings of management.
To bridge the above gap, we examined how a natural
resource management system for MCNP can be antago-
nistic for communities adjacent to the park. For instance,
one of the difficulties came from the participatory
approach of the regime assisting locals mostly when
their needs closely match state aspirations of manage-
ment. In effect, we saw that the locals responded in
passive ways such as expressions of frustration and grie-
vances voicing their dissatisfaction against the regime.
However, we observed that even where people might
be victims of the management system, they carve space
for exerting their agency where they devise alternative
strategies to attain various needs. Rather than renegotiat-
ing their subordinate role in the management regime,
some locals get around the system by using economic
incentives to improve their livelihoods. Further, they hold
onto their traditions through religious beliefs. These,
based on the analysis, are the expressions of collective
agency in antagonistic policy environments.
These responses, based on the analysis, are expres-
sions of agency in antagonistic policy environments. We
reiterate that local people, although subjected to chal-
lenges in the institutional management of natural
resources, do have a capacity for collective engagement
in attaining their needs. This capacity, indeed, lies in
locally embedded mechanisms for agency, such as the
activeness of traditional institutions in communities, the
ability for locals to act more wisely and initiate construc-
tive needs, where management regimes have less mon-
itoring and control on the land, and, where people are
muchawareof thedifficulties posedby resourcemanage-
ment systems.
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